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Page 1: The Final ChapterBy Thet Sambath and Adam Piore
Monday, May 15th, 2000
The Veil of Secrecy is Lifting On the Last Days of the Khmer Rouge
Anlong Veng Town, Oddar Meanchey province -- In the end, the fierce one-legged warrior who presided over so many battles, who ordered so many attacks, who oversaw so much terror in the name of Khmer nationalism, was captured unarmed, outside his own country in the jungles of Thailand.
Ta Mok, the last defiant Khmer Rouge leader, placed himself voluntarily in government custody about one year ago not far from here.
Those who remained loyal to the notorious rebel virtually to the end claim he knew he faced prison, yet wanted to bring peace to his followers.
Some of his own former soldiers who helped capture him believe he hoped, almost to the last moment, that he would not go to jail. Ta Mok, they say, was lured by a false offer of amnesty.
Whatever the truth, the veil of secrecy that has long enshrouded this last Khmer Rouge stronghold is lifting, one year after the end of the decades-old movement that almost destroyed Khmer culture, killing more than 1 million people and helping make Cambodia one of the worlds poorest nations.
Today those who helped lure Ta Mok into government hands, those close to the 1997 murder of movement co-founder Son Sen and the ensuing Ta Mok-ordered arrest of Pol Pot, ordinary villagers, and commanders who led the crippling final mass defection here, are retelling their version of events.
And in those accounts, new details are emerging about the final days of the Khmer Rouge.
Mass Defection Splits Leaders The beginning of the end, say those living here at Pol Pots last headquarters, was the defection of the northwestern towns of Pailin and Phnom Malai to the government in 1996. It was immediately apparent that the loss of the gem-and-timber-rich territory would cripple the Khmer Rouge financially. The psychological blow of losing some 15,000 loyal soldiers and Khmer Rouge civilians, as well as former deputy premier Ieng Sary, was also significant.
But many here now say it was the political consequences inside the Khmer Rouge power structure that were the most devastating.
It had been almost 20 years since the Cambodian communist movement had experienced such a traumatic split. This rupture, like the purges in 1978 that resulted in mass desertions to Vietnam, would alter the course of Khmer Rouge history.
The trouble started with an order that came down to the border trading towns in 1996, residents of the two towns and officials here say.
Longtime defense minister Son Sen ordered Pailin and Malai to relinquish control of all private property, including motorbikes, cows, trucks, and saw mills, to the Khmer Rouge organization, they say.
The directive caused an uproar and escalated tensions between the movements headquarters in Anlong Veng and Pailin, its most important strategic stronghold to the west.
Former Khmer Rouge general Ke Pauk, a senior subordinate of Son Sen and once ranked sixth in the movements hierarchy, claimed in two interviews in mid-February that Son Sen acted on his own without Pol Pots approval, but most other Anlong Veng officials and genocide researchers say Son Sen was acting on behalf of Pol Pot.
At first, most believed the problem could be resolved, said Ke Pauk who was in Anlong Veng at the time. Pol Pot ordered his most prominent followersTa Mok, Son Sen and Nuon Cheato go to Pailin and Malai and negotiate a compromise.
The three failed in their mission.
Ta Mok did not solve the problem. On the contrary, he made a small problem a big problem, Ke Pauk said, sitting outside his Siem Reap home.
Suong Sikoeun, an official at the foreign affairs ministry during the Democratic Kampuchea regime, agreed, saying Ta Mok did not negotiate when he visited Malai. He only said he supported Son Sen and was stubborn, Suong Sikoeun recalled in an interview in March at his Malai home.
Furthermore, some ex-Khmer Rouge who stayed with the movement until the last waves of defections in late 1998 and 1999, said in recent weeks that Son Sens directive was a justified response to Ieng Sarys inability to account for up to $10 million in rebel funds, allegedly swindled by Thai businessmen.
However, others who defected in 1996 said the order was a strong-arm attempt by Pol Pots clique, isolated in Anlong Veng, to reestablish authority over rebel settlements near trading routes to Thailand, where the quality of life was better compared to jungle bases.
Whatever the differences, they were intractable.
The final split occurred at a July 1996 meeting in Phnom Malai, 80 km north of Pailin on the Thai border, military analysts say. Present were Ta Mok; Ieng Sary; Y Chhien, the former commander of guerrilla division 415 and now Pailin governor; and others.
Ieng Sary and Y Chhien, joined by division 450 commander Sok Pheap, led Pailin and Malai away from the rest of the movement in August. Three months later, they went over to their long-time foes, officially joining the government in Phnom Penh.
At the time of the August rupture, clandestine Khmer Rouge radio denounced Pailin chief Ieng Sary as a traitor and accused him of losing millions of the movements dollars that had been provided by the Chinese government between 1985-91.
He has been cutting down trees and selling logs to make big profits for himself....He has helped the two-headed government with strategy and brought them to attack our bases in Pailin and Malai, said a female announcer, refering to Phnom Penh authorities led by first prime minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh and second prime minister Hun Sen.
The extraordinary rebel radio broadcast attacking one of the movements highest leaders signaled to the world that Ieng Sary had fallen out of favor with the Khmer Rouge nerve center.
Indeed, Ieng Sary and Pol Potbrothers-in-law who studied Marxist-Leninist theory together in Paris in the 1950s, helped bring order to the Cambodian communist movement in Phnom Penh beginning in 1956, and spearheaded the 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea regimehad parted ways.
The fighting began almost immediately.
In interviews last year in Ieng Sarys stronghold of Pailin, former Khmer Rouge fighters recalled being summoned to a cave by their commanders during the standoff that summer in 1996 and told that Ta Mok planned to kill their leader Y Chhien.
Ta Mok came here and tried to destroy us, Ieng Vuth, Ieng Sarys son and Pailins first deputy governor, said in March 1999.
According to Huth Bo, 35, who was a company commander based in Pailin, Ta Mok began to move units from other regions, bringing in artillery and laying mines in an area near Pailin known as Zone 250. Y Chhien convened a meeting of local commanders and asked them: Do you want to follow Ta Mok, or do we find our own way and survive? Huth Bo recalled.
The commanders took a vote and decided to fight, Pailin residents said last year. Y Chhien came to the front lines and took half his troops to fight Ta Mok, leaving the rest in defensive positions to oppose government forces, Huth Bo said. Everybody agreed we should fight Ta Mok, he said.
Others had to choose sides. Troops loyal to Son Sens brother Ny Khorn, based between Malai and Pailin at Phnom Dei at Sampov Loun district, supported Ta Mok and Son Sen.
While Ke Pauk claimed he had 1,000 fighters, Tep Kunnal, a member of the Khmer Rouges foreign ministry and associate of Pol Pot in recent years, said 250 was closer to the truth.
Whatever the force, it was outnumbered and out-gunned by the Pailin units supporting Ieng Sary and Y Chhien and defending their home terrain. Ny Khorns troops were subdued.
Pailin officially joined the government Nov 6. It was hailed as a milestone by Phnom Penh in its taxing 20-year fight against the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen visited Pailin under heavy security and celebrations lasted for several days.
Ny Khorn finally joined the government, along with brother Son Chhum and Ta Mok son-in-law Meas Ta Muth, in December 1996. The three had been captured in October and held captive in Pailin by Y Chhien for several months until they agreed to pledge loyalty to the King and the Constitution.
Meanwhile, Ta Mok, Son Sen and Nuon Chea had remained out of the fray, fleeing to their home territory through Thailand, said Khem Them. He was one of Ta Moks most loyal lieutenants before defecting to the government in December 1998.
Some 200 km away at Anlong Veng, Pol Pot was furious.
He decided that harsh punishment was in order. Ta Mok, Nuon Chea and Son Sen returned to headquarters Dec 15, said Tep Kunnal, one of the foreign affairs ministry officials who was in Anlong Veng at the time, in a March interview.
Pol Pot suspected the three were involved with Hun Sen, Ke Pauk said. The reason is because Pol Pot asked the three to solve the problem, so why was it not solved? Why did the situation deteriorate?
Each man was ordered to stay in his home, effectively under house arrest.
It marked the beginning of the internal leadership feud among the remaining hardliners. All except Pol Pot had channels of contact to the Phnom Penh government, military intelligence officials said, testing loyalty and fueling feelings of distrust in tight-knit Anlong Veng. Leadership responsibilities were shuffled. In the end, a shocking murder destablized the crumbling movement and balance would never again return.
The above article was reprinted with the permission of The Cambodia Daily. Copyright 2000 by the Camboda Daily. The article may not be reproduced further over the Internet or in print without the written permission of The Cambodia Daily. |
Disclaimer: KC articles are pubished for the information and entertainment of members of KC. The material published is selected for its interest and the views expressed therein are not necessarily those of KC nor its staff. |
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